By Laura Carlsen
Not only did Donald J. Trump win the US presidential against his Democratic rival Vice President Kamala Harris, he won every one of the seven swing states in play (North Carolina, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Nevada and Georgia), swept the Electoral College with 312 to 226 votes, and the Republican party took the House and Senate. The Republicans also have 27 governors, to the Democrats’ 23. With conservatives having taken control of the Supreme Court and courts across the nation, there are very few counterweights to Trump’s power for the next four years.
But U.S. politics continues to be deeply divided. To date according to the Cook Political Report, Trump did not take the popular vote, although he is beating Harris with 49.8 percent to 48.2 percent. In the perverse US democratic system, in recent times two Republican candidates, including Trump in 2017, have taken office having lost the popular vote.
Why did people vote for Trump?
The first question observers outside the U.S. ask is: Given that the candidate is a condemned sex offender with multiple accusations pending, a felon declared guilty on 34 felony counts of falsifying business accounts, and a hate-monger who has slammed major sectors of the population including women, Mexicans, immigrants of color in general, Muslims, and others, why did nearly 77 million US citizens vote for him?
The analysis of the vote, based on exit polls and updated 2024 vote data, provides clues to the significant rightward shift in the United States. While there were many elements involved, four factors explain Trump’s voter appeal: inflation, patriarchy, racism and national malaise. All of these were amplified by aggressive messaging on commercial and social media– including slurs and lies– and the construction of a broad and mobilized far-right grassroots movement that began before and will endure after the elections.
1) Inflation directly affects households in the middle to lower-income sectors. The Trump campaign blamed inflation on the Biden administration although it was largely caused by the pandemic and Biden reduced inflation from 7% in 2021 to 2.6% in 2024. Nonetheless, the majority of voters reported feeling worse off than in 2020 and the economy was by far the greatest concern reported.
2) The patriarchy factor is among the most influential and least analyzed. There was a 10-point gender gap in the presidential vote, with Trump taking 55% of the male vote overall and carefully cultivating this base in his campaign. This gap is not larger than the preference of men for Republicans in recent decades, but Harris expected to reduce the gap and to compensate by garnering more of the women’s vote, due to widespread support for abortion rights. She ended up underperforming Biden among women by three points, according to some exit polls because many women viewed her as too weak to preside over the nation. Women, who often manage household budgets, also cited inflation as a reason for voting Republican. Racism and Trump’s white supremacist and anti-immigrant positions also played a role as a majority of white women voted for Trump. Harris’s father is Black and her mother Indian.
The gender gap widens among youth and Latino men. Fifty-four percent of Latino men voted for Trump, but only 37% of Latina women. Biden beat Trump among Latino men by 23 points in 2020, this time Trump beat Harris among Latino men by 10 points—a 33 point flip. The Trump campaign’s overtly sexist appeals focused on reinforcing traditional sex roles and stereotypes—attacking Harris as too weak to stand up to world leaders, posting heinous insinuations that she attained political prominence by offering sexual favors, promoting patriarchy as “family values” and targeting voter mobilization on men. It worked, especially in a macho culture of male dominance. Young men 18-29 years old voted 55% Trump, compared to 41% from young women.
The use of immigration as a wedge issue with heavy racist undertones repeats the right’s strategy in 2016 and 2020. Trump and supporters used outright lies to inflate the number of undocumented workers in the United States, to project the image of an “invasion” even as border apprehensions have dropped and to build on white supremacist fears of “replacement” and job insecurity.
Finally, Harris carried the burden of Joe Biden’s 57% disapproval rate, owing to nationwide inflation, the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, his cognitive deterioration and the right-hyped border “invasion”. But the Trump campaign tapped into something deeper as well. His victory, especially in the working-class swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, played on real insecurities and discontent with the system. Marco Castillo of Global Exchange cites the patent failure of neoliberalism and the Democrats continued for it as the main impetus behind the liberal exodus.
In this vein, Independent Senator Bernie Sanders slammed the Democratic party for abandoning the working class causing the working class to abandon it. “While the Democratic leadership defends the status quo, the American people are angry and want change. And they’re right”, he said in a post-elections interview. Sanders cited the billions spent on the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, failure to address wealth inequality, a worsening standard of living and the high cost and low quality of medical care. The Democratic Party’s shift right to the center left it in the middle of nowhere on the political map.
Of course, there’s a bitter irony the fact that the rejection of the neoliberal model would drive voters to Trump– a product of the rigged free-market system if ever there was one. Although many rightwing candidates espouse unmitigated capitalis– from Milei’s anarcho-capitalism to Trump’s croney corruption-based version–they talk change and use anti-systemic rhetoric. Trump succeeded in painting a grim picture of “America” in 2024 that resonated with millions of voters who were encouraged to view the present as chaotic and threatening so Donald J. Trump could ride in as the savior.
Mexico in the eye of the hurricane
There’s an international consensus that Mexico will be the foreign nation most affected under the second Trump presidency. Draconian policies on immigration, crime, protectionism, far-right attacks on the left and rampant misogyny will all have a direct impact on the binational relationship.
Immigration and border policy, to be placed under Trump’s nomination for Secretary of Homeland Security, South Dakota governor Kristi Noem, includes proposals for mass deportation, sealing the border and denying asylum rights. Noem sent state National Guard to the border five times to prove her anti-immigrant creds despite leading a state closer to the Canadian than the Mexican border. She will be guided by chief advisor Stephen Miller, notorious anti-immigrant brain behind the brawn on policy issues. Trump named Tom Homan, a former cop and Border Patrol agent, as “border czar”. Homan was hardline interim head of ICE who initiated the program of family separation in the first Trump administration.
Trump and his team have been vague regarding how deeply deportations will cut into U.S. communities, economies and families in the coming years. The American Immigration Council estimates that the cost of a mass deportation campaign affecting the estimated 13 million in the country would be at least $315 billion dollars. Depending on how extensive deportation is, Mexico stands to lose part of its remittances, which amounted to $63 billion in 2023.
There will also be increased pressure on Mexico to reinstate some form of Remain in Mexico program and to receive individuals expelled from the United States. Under Remain in Mexico, 72,000 asylum seekers were returned to Mexico, with some 450,000 expelled under Title 42. The Biden-Harris government did not dismantle these structures so Trump now controls a vast infrastructure for migrant repression. Meanwhile, as Mexico knows well, migratory flows from Central America, Cuba, Venezuela and a growing list of nations continue.
Mexico will also face increased pressure to intensify a binational drug war that its government has correctly denounced as ineffective, counterproductive and interventionist. The AMLO government ended the Merida Initiative and entered into the Bicentennial Agreement, supposedly to shift the focus to public health. However, under US dictates and in the context of the growing fentanyl epidemic, key strategies including the DEA’s kingpin strategy, never really changed and violence continued. Trump’s macho threats of invasion of the armed forces, bombing Mexican drug labs, and economic reprisals might not be carried out, but pressure on Mexico will continue to allow greater US presence at grave risk of escalating violence in Mexico.
On Nov. 25 Trump posted that he would apply a 25% tariff on Mexican goods to remain until “Drugs, in particular Fentanyl, and all Illegal Aliens stop this Invasion of our Country!” (sic). President Sheinbaum sent a diplomatic letter calling for cooperation and stating that for every tariff imposed there would be another in response. The threat of tariffs on goods with Chinese components or for not adopting U.S. policy on drugs and immigration can seriously disrupt the Mexican economy, but tariffs would also seriously disrupt the U.S. economy. It remains to be seen how far Trump will take the threat since he cannot risk spiking inflation after seeing what a powerful populist issue it is at the polls. However, Mexico must prepare to negotiate, respond and shield itself against such measures.
The doors that open
The saying “Cuando una puerta se cierra, otra se abre” “when one door closes another one opens), is not just empty consolation. There are important opportunities for Mexico and the Sheinbaum government in the second Trump presidency.
First, increased hostility and threats from the U.S., particularly of tariffs, must accelerate a process of diversification, domestic sourcing and markets, and South-South integration. The AMLO government promoted these polices sporadically and now is the time to bring them into a coordinated medium-term economic plan. As Trump threatens to impose tariffs on automobiles and other products under his America First policies, Mexico can reciprocate with its own measures—a right of developing countries that was ignored in NAFTA and its successor the US Mexico Canada Agreement.
The Sheinbaum government must reassess its current commitment to nearshoring as Mexico’s economic future. First, savvy economic planning must take into account the short-term risks of punishment measures and Trump’s bully behavior, including breaking trade agreements. Second, there are the long-term risks of depending on the U.S. given the steady deterioration of U.S. leadership in the global economy as de-dollarization advances in many parts of the world and emerging economies are organizing to break from U.S. hegemony. Latin American south-south organisms, particularly CELAC, can and should be strengthened in this context.
Mexico should not play into cold war rhetoric and the looming trade war promoted by Trump, Rubio and other anti-China hawks. To offer up Mexico as the anti-China alternative would ultimately destabilize Mexico economically and politically, increase dependency on an unstable U.S., and create tension in regional and global relations.
Instead, a balanced long-term economic strategy will optimize and increase Mexico’s strengths. Sheinbaum announced that Mexico will not join BRICS, in deference to its primary trade and investment ally, the United States. It is imperative to reconsider Mexico’s refusal to join BRICS. The IMF has stated that in the next five years, BRICS countries will be the primary contributor to global growth. Turning its back on emerging economies and deepening dependency on the U.S. economy controlled by an unscrupulous and avaricious Trump would be a costly strategic mistake for Mexico. Mexico must protect itself from U.S. threats and economic and political crisis by increasing sovereignty through promotion and protection of local markets and industries, and diversifying and strengthening ties with Latin American, the Global South, China and the European Union.
Second, Mexico can strategically use its power as the U.S.’s major trade partner to demand reciprocity in renewing the TMEC and to call the U.S. bluff on trade threats. Tariffs can do damage, but if Mexico has detailed scenario studies and plans for predicting, assessing and reducing damage it can weather the storm and find itself in calmer waters.
Since U.S. interests would also be negatively affected, building alliances with affected sectors in the U.S. will be key. This has happened in other instances of import restrictions and tariff threats, with protests from US economy importers, supply chains and consumers. Despite obvious asymmetries, Mexico is not a victim–it is a powerful ally and must negotiate from that stance.
Secretary of the Economy Marcelo Ebrard has direct experience negotiating with Trump. This knowledge and a shared transactional approach to politics could help Mexico navigate the storm. On the negative side, Ebrard has touted Mexico’s friendship with a global leader who represents the advance of authoritarian, imperialist and racist policies that are the antithesis of most Mexicans’ values. He has also shown a tendency to sacrifice human rights for a deal. Neither of these conciliatory strategies will produce positive long-term results. Mexico can negotiate based on its strengths while still retaining its values and being realistic about the power imbalance and vulnerability it faces vis a vis the United States.
Third, on immigration, Mexico should step up as a leader on rational, human rights-based immigration policy. Trump has threatened reprisals for anything but a hardline on immigration contention and it may not be possible to change course immediately. However, a recent policy brief by Mexican civil society organizations lays out important measures Mexico can carry out, including a robust program for the reintegration of deported immigrants and policies for returning migrants that recognize their contribution to the economy. Documentation must be facilitated to get children in school and workers back to work and to assure repatriation of assets. Even if contention policies cannot be reversed, they can be demilitarized and complemented with measures to: accelerate the lawful integration of those who seek asylum here, issue humanitarian visas for safe transit and work permits for those awaiting processing, and provide the needed infrastructure to assure migrant families’ basic needs and safety.
The Trump administration will demand a return in some form to Remain in Mexico. Mexico must assert its right to control its borders and accept returning migrants from other countries under its own terms, with commitments of support to guarantee their humanitarian treatment under international conventions. Trump’s recent threat to use the army on the Mexican border has caused pushback even within the Pentagon. Here again, U.S. law and internal pressures will be a guardrail against some of Trump’s most extreme proposals even before they are implemented and negatively affect Mexico.
Trump will also likely seek Safe Third Country agreements in the continent as he did when he signed those agreements in 2019 with Guatemala and El Salvador. Central American nations will be pressured to reduce outmigration but the new U.S. government is very unlikely to direct funding to address the causes of migration. Its strategy will continue to be repression and externalization of its borders in violation of the national sovereignty of other nations. Mexico must lead in the analysis and solution to the deep causes by promoting and building on regional agreements and proposals.
Fourth, the threat of Trump and members of his cabinet to invade, bomb or otherwise punish Mexico for “weakness” on confronting cartels must be called out for what it is—a bluff to cover up the egregious failure of the U.S. to control the epidemic of overdose fatalities within its own borders. Caving to pressure to reinforce the failed bilateral drug war would increase violence and cartel strength in Mexico to dangerous proportions.
Finally, as the Trump administration shows itself to be a global violator of human rights, Mexico can be a global example. Our country now leads in guaranteeing the sexual and reproductive rights of women and states must guarantee the legal structures to lock that in place. As noted above, Mexico can also do far more in asserting the human rights of migrants and recognizing the benefits of migration. As wealth inequality deepens in the U.S. with Trump’s tax cuts to the super rich, Mexico can demonstrate the benefits of wealth redistribution and respect for social and economic rights. The past government violated the rights of indigenous peoples, criticized feminist demands to reduce gender-based violence and refused to defend rights when they affected its interests and the re-appointment of the previous Ombudsman signals continuity, but Mexican still has the opportunity to place human rights at the center of its plans.
All of this requires all-of-government coordination to develop plans and responses to specific scenarios based on likely actions by the Trump administration. It also requires involvement of an informed citizenry. Organized civil society was too often treated as an impediment to change under the last administration. This time around it will should be the government’s greatest ally, to create a strong and united Mexico capable of assuming the challenge of facing a Trump government from a principled stance and a long-term vision of the common good.
Laura holds an interdisciplinary B.A. in Gender Studies and an M.A. in Latin American Studies, both from Stanford University. A dual citizen (Mexican and U.S.). International relations analyst, journalist, researcher and consultant on movement building and gender justice in the Western Hemisphere. She is Mira: feminisms and democracy’s director.
